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Abstract: 
We study the effects of liquidity constraints and start-up costs on the relationship between wealth and the
fraction of entrepreneurs in an economy. We develop a dynamic occupational choice model that yields
predictions that can be tested on cross-sectional data with exogenous variation in liquidity constraints (e.g.
access to credit) and start-up costs. We use three highly comparable micro datasets (SHARE, ELSA and HRS)
focusing on the population age 50+ in 9 countries. These countries have very different levels of start-up costs
and potential liquidity constraints. Reduced form results support our theoretical predictions. While higher
liquidity constraints yield a steeper wealth profile for the fraction of workers in entrepreneurship, startup costs
flatten this relationship by depressing the marginal value of being an entrepreneur as a function of wealth.
Countries with high start-up costs such as Italy, Spain and France have flatter wealth gradients. 
Keywords: entrepreneurship, liquidity constraints, start up costs, occupational choice, cross-country
comparisons
JEL Classification: E21, E23, J2
Résumé:
Nous étudions dans cet article l'effet des contraintes de liquidité et des coûts de création d'entreprise sur la
relation entre la richesse et la proportion d'entrepreneurs dans l'économie. Nous proposons en premier lieu
un modèle théorique dynamique visant à comprendre la décision de devenir entrepreneur dans un
environnement où les agents font face à des contraintes de liquidité. Le modèle prédit une relation croissante
entre le niveau de richesse la proportion d'entrepreneurs dans l'économie. Cette courbe s'aplatit en présence
de coûts élevés de création d'entreprise. Nous utilisons ensuite trois bases de données (SHARE, ELSA et
HRS) qui fournissent des informations comparables sur les individus de plus de 50 ans dans 9 pays
caractérisés par des niveaux très hétérogènes de coûts de création d'entreprise. Les estimations confirment
le résultat théorique : l'estimation d'un logit multinomial tenant compte des caractéristiques individuelles
confirme que les coûts de création d'entreprise et les contraintes de liquidité pèsent sur la création d'entreprise.
Toutefois, l'effet des coûts de création d'entreprise affecte en particulier les individus dont la richesse se situe
au milieu de la distribution.  2 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Over  the  last  two  decades,  self-employment  and  entrepreneurship  have  attracted 
attention in public policy circles as well as in labor economics. Self-employment is seen by 
many as a form of employment that may help resolve aging-related fiscal problems since such 
workers tend to retire later. It is also seen as an engine of entrepreneurial activity that has the 
potential to deliver more jobs in the future. Self-employment is not marginal phenomena in 
most OECD countries (Blanchflower, 2000) and it can be asked if prevailing institutions met 
the needs of self-employed workers 
We are interested in to study self-employment as a marker of entrepreneurial spirit, 
even if it is not always trivial to disentangle this in self-employment data. In a recent study, 
Hochguertel (2005) finds that very little of the difference in self-employment rates across 
European  countries  is  explained  by  observable  characteristics  of  workers.  This  leaves 
considerable room for institutions to play a role. Fonseca et al. (2001) show at a theoretical 
level that less individuals become entrepreneurs when start-up costs are higher. Nicoletti et al. 
(1999) document large cross-country differences in start-up costs. On the other hand, Evans 
and  Jovanovic  (1989)  show  that  under  liquidity  constraints,  the  probability  of 
entrepreneurship  increases  with  assets.  Evans  and  Leighton  (1989)  find  support  for  this 
hypothesis  on  U.S.  data.  The  importance  of  liquidity  constraints  and  access  to  capital  is 
supported by empirical evidence presented by Blanchflower et Oswald (1998) and Guiso, 
Sapienza et Zingales (2002).
5  
We build on dynamic occupational choice models of Cagetti and De Nardi (2005) and 
Luo  (2005)  to  study  how  liquidity  constraints  and  start-up  costs  affect  the  relationship 
between wealth and the fraction of entrepreneurs in an economy. The model yields testable 
predictions on the stationary distribution of wealth that can be tested using cross-sectional 
data where variation in liquidity constraints (access to capital) and start-up costs is available. 
We  use  three  comparable  micro  datasets  (HRS,  SHARE  and  ELSA)  focusing  on  the 
population age 50+ in 9 countries. These countries have very different levels of start-up costs 
and liquidity constraints measured by the facility with which entrepreneurs have access to 
capital. We use various indices from the literature to characterize the institutional setup in 
                                                
5 Hurst and Lusardi (2004) challenge the hypothesis that liquidity constraints play a role. Their key argument is 
that the probability of entrepreneurship in the U.S. increases only for extremely rich individuals, less likely to be 
liquidity constrainted. Cagetti and DeNardi (2005) show that this may have something to do with the definition 
of entrepreneurship used in their analysis.    3 
each country (La Porta et al., 1998; Nicoletti et al., 1999; Fonseca et al., 2001; Acs et al., 
2004). 
Empirical results support our theoretical predictions. While liquidity constraints yield 
a steeper wealth gradient for the fraction of workers in entrepreneurship, start-up costs flatten 
this relationship by depressing the marginal value of being an entrepreneur as a function of 
initial wealth. Countries with high start-up costs such as Italy, Spain and France have flatter 
wealth gradients for the fraction of entrepreneurs in this age group.  
In Section 2 and 3, we present the data used to test predictions. In section 4, we set up 
the model, calibrate it to one particular economy and generate predictions on the effect of 
liquidity constraints and start-up costs on the relationship between wealth and the fraction of 
entrepreneurs in an economy. In section 5, we discuss the identification strategy and discuss 
the results. Section 6 concludes with further comments.  
 
2. Entrepreneurs in Europe and US  
 
We use three comparable datasets composed of age 50+ individuals in 9 countries. The 
Survey  of  Health,  Ageing  and  Retirement  in  Europe  (SHARE)  was  fielded  in  2004  and 
composed of representative samples of the population in 10 European countries. For analysis, 
we keep Germany, Sweden, The Netherlands, Spain, Italy, France and Denmark. Because of 
small sample size we decided not to use data from Switzerland. In addition, because we could 
not find good comparable measures of the regulatory environment facing entrepreneurs in 
Austria and Greece we did not include those either in our analysis. Two additional countries 
can be included because of the availability of comparable datasets; the United States using the 
Health and Retirement Study (HRS) and England using the English Longitudinal Study of 
Ageing (ELSA). We use the 2002 wave from the HRS and the 2003 wave from ELSA. We 
only keep respondents between 50 and 80 years old, 50 is the minimum age to be eligible to 
the survey and 80, because there are very few people into the labor market after this age. An 
analysis over the whole life-cycle would be preferable but no data as rich as the ones used 
here are available to perform such analysis. Hence, we concentrate on older respondents. 
Definitions of variables are displayed in Appendix A.  
We  use  the  definition  self-employment  as  our  definition  of  entrepreneurship.
6 
Although this definition has drawbacks it avoids having to deal with the joint ownership of 
                                                
6 Self-employed working for pay. Then, we do not consider unpaid self employed. This group is included in 
inactivity.   4 
business assets and other complicated arrangements. We denote these self-employed workers 
as entrepreneurs. In Table 1, we show the fraction of respondents not working, working for 
pay,  and  entrepreneurs.  We  can  point  out  that  the  percentage  of  entrepreneurs  varies 
considerably across countries. For example, among the population aged 50-80, there are only 
5.2% entrepreneurs in France while there are 11.76% entrepreneurs in Italy, 10.89% in Spain 
and 10.4% in United States. The fraction in inactivity also varies remarkably. In Italy and in 
Spain, almost two thirds of the non working population is inactive at this age while less than a 
half is inactive in United States, in Sweden and in Denmark.  
 
Table 1 Occupational Status by Country Population Aged 50-80 
Country non working workers entrepreneur
United States 46.7 42.94 10.36
England 50.05 40.06 9.89
Germany 59.37 33.66 6.97
Sweden 41.35 50.08 8.57
The Netherlands 57.19 36.5 6.31
Spain 63.24 25.88 10.89
Italy 68.54 19.7 11.76
France 59.67 35.09 5.24
Denmark 45.74 47.66 6.6
Source: HRS, ELSA and SHARE, population below 80 and older than 50 
years old, weighted  
 
Given the huge importance of the non working population in some countries, we must explore 
the  generosity  of  outside  options  for  entrepreneurs  as  generous  replacement  ratios  for 
retirement or other “opportunities” on the labor market (Italy, Spain, Denmark and France 
have higher unemployment rates than the average). On average across countries more than 
14% of individuals are involved in entrepreneurship as a fraction of the working population. 
This ranges from near 30% in Spain and Italy to 11% in Denmark. As a fraction of workers, 
these differences are exacerbated in Italy and Spain since the fraction in paid employment is 
rather low. Inactivity benefits in old age include retirement, disability and unemployment. We 
report on the vertical axis of Figure 1 the replacement ratio of each inactivity scheme (as 
reported by Blondal and Scarpetta (1999)) for  the  countries of our sample. The share  of 
entrepreneurs as a fraction of workers (own computations of HRS-ELSA-SHARE datasets) is 
displayed with a line. Figure 1 suggests that there is no a clear relationship between the share 
of entrepreneurs and the generosity level of any of the inactivity benefit. One exception is 
Italy  and  Spain.  Both  countries  have  very  high  net  retirement  replacement  rates  which 
probably explain the low participation rates. But the Netherlands have also high replacement   5 
rates, and the fraction of entrepreneurs is closer to countries such as England and United 
States. We will then take into account the outside options in our analysis both at theoretical 
and empirical level. 
 
Figure 1 Entrepreneurs and replacement ratios as outside options: Non-employment benefit 




























One of the major strengths of each dataset is that they provide comparable measures of 
financial  wealth.  For  entrepreneurs  we  have  information  on  their  current  wealth.  Hence, 
evidence  of  liquidity  constraint  cannot  be  simply  inferred  from  cross-sectional  variation 
across individuals in the probability of entrepreneurship and wealth as in studies that look 
explicitly at ex ante wealth and the subsequent entry probability. As we show later, we can 
identify the effect of institutions by using cross-country variation.  
We  define  wealth  as  the  sum  of  the  net  value  of  housing,  stocks,  bonds,  saving 
accounts, private retirement accounts and other annuities minus all debt the household may 
have.
7  This definition does not include business assets which is coherent with the definition 
that we will use in the model in the next section 4. We adjust wealth levels for exchange rate 
and power purchasing parity using OECD figures.  
 
 
                                                
7 See table A.2. for more details.    6 
Table 2 Net Wealth by Occupational Status and Percentiles 
Net Wealth p5 p10 p25  p50 p75 p90 p95 p99
non working 0.416 2.948 35.753 130.221 264.206 470.413 670.443 960.772
workers 3.570 9.784 54.601 141.551 282.143 477.605 641.757 928.225
entrepreneur 3.824 20.357 89.917 219.873 401.111 632.117 779.951 971.276
Total 1.124 5.670 45.991 139.572 283.117 493.513 676.218 955.333
Source: HRS, ELSA and SHARE, population below 80 and older than 50 years old, weighted. Net Wealth by occupation status and percentiles  
 
Net wealth by occupational status and percentiles (over all countries) is shown in table 
2. From these figures, it is clear that entrepreneur have more financial wealth then other 
respondents, although differences seem to vanish at the top of the wealth distribution. This 
can  reflect  differences  in  ability  or  ex  ante  wealth  (wealth  prior  to  entry)  or  ex  post 
differences  in  the  returns  to  entrepreneurship.  The  theoretical  model  we  present  latter 
addresses these issues. 
 
3. Institutional variables 
In  SHARE,  only  one  wave  of  data  is  available  although  it  is  projected  to  follow 
respondents over time in the future. With a panel, we could study the probability of entry into 
entrepreneurship  as  a  function  of  initial  wealth.  However,  we  claim  that  we  can  use 
institutional variation, for example in start up costs and liquidity constraints to show how the 
relationship between wealth and the probability of entrepreneurship varies across countries.  
We first document whether start-up costs and financial barriers to entrepreneurship are 
different across countries. There is a considerably large literature devoted to the construction 
of various indices of start-up costs and financial barriers to entrepreneurship. Because each 
index measures different dimensions of barriers, we aggregate them in two families using 
principal component analysis. The first index measures start-up costs. It is constructed from 
indices  provided  in  Nicoletti  et  al.  (1999)  and  Fonseca  et  al.  (2001).  The  second  index 
measures the extent of potential liquidity constraints across countries. It is constructed from 
La Porta et al. (1998), Reynolds et al.(2005) and Acs et al. (2006).
8 Figure 3 gives the values 




                                                
8 Each index is centered on zero and normalized to have unit variance. Details on the construction of these 
indices can be found in Appendix A.   7 
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Notes: indices defined in Appendix C. DK = Denmark, US = U.S., SE = Sweden, EN = 
England, NL = Netherlands, DE = Germany, E = Spain, FR = France, IT = Italy. 
 
From Figure 3, we see that indices are positively correlated. High start-up costs are 
usually associated with high potential for liquidity constraints. Southern European countries 
are clearly distinct from Anglo-Saxon and Germanic countries in this regard. Sweden stands 
out as different with relatively higher potential for liquidity constraints but low start-up costs 
(Reynols et al. (2005) and Acs et al., 2006). This shows that the set of countries we consider 
areheterogeneous in terms of start-up costs and liquidity constraints.  
 
4. A Simple Model of Entrepreneurship 
 
We build a simple model of entrepreneurship along the lines of Cagetti and De Nardi 
(2005), Luo (2005) and Quadrini (2000). In particular, following Cagetti and De Nardi (2005) 
and Luo (2005),  we consider a  model of heterogeneous  agents  with occupational choice. 
Wealth and entry into entrepreneurship are endogenous. Entrepreneurs can borrow capital 
from  banks  to expand  their  business.  However,  because  of  limited  enforceability  of  loan 
contracts,  banks  are  reluctant  to  grant  credit  to  entrepreneurs  with  low  levels  of  wealth. 
Wealth plays the role of collateral and limits default. We add start up costs to the model.  
 
In addition to savings and entrepreneurial choices, we allow the individual to consider 
inactivity. Indeed, old individuals may withdraw from the labor force rather than continuing   8 
activity. This allows getting a complete picture of occupational choices in old age as a less 
generous old age pension may entice individuals to delay retirement and consider starting 
their  own  business.  They  can  also  have  big  incentives  to  be  inactivity  (retirement, 
unemployment or disability can be here interpreted as being inactive). In addition, start up 
costs, by shifting the expected entrepreneurial gains, may actually affect these choices.  
Each person possesses two abilities, entrepreneurial and worker, which we take to be 
exogenous, positively correlated over time, and uncorrelated with each other.
9 
•  Entrepreneurial ability (θ ) is the capacity to invest capital more or less productively, 
•  Working ability (ε ) is the capacity to produce income out of labor. 
  
4.1 Corporate Sector 
 
The non-entrepreneurial technology is represented by a standard Cobb-Douglas production 
function 
1 ( , ) c c c c c F K L A K L
α α − =  
where  c K  and  c L are the total capital and labor inputs in the non-entrepreneurial sector and  A 
is a constant capturing the technology scale. In both sectors, capital depreciates at a rate δ . 
The scalar α  represents the share of capital in production. The problem solved by the non-
entrepreneur sector is 
c c c c
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α δ = + . 




                                                
9 In future drafts, we plan to allow abilities to be correlated.   9 
Entrepreneurs can borrow and invest capital in a technology whose return depends on the 
entrepreneurs'  own  entrepreneurial  ability:  those  with  higher  ability  levels  have  higher 
average  and  marginal  returns  from  capital.  When  the  entrepreneur  invests  some  working 
capital k, production is 
1 0 , ≤ ≤ν θ
ν k A . 
The scalar ν  is set smaller than one to reflect decreasing returns from investment, as 
entrepreneur’s managerial skills become gradually stretched over larger and larger projects. 
Hence, while entrepreneurial ability is exogenously given, the entrepreneurial rate of return 
from investing in capital is endogenous and is a function of k the size of the project that the 
entrepreneur implements. 
Following Cagetti and De Nardi (2005) and Luo (2005), we assume that entrepreneurs 
work on their own project without hiring labor and that all of the workers are hired by the 
non-entrepreneurial sector. Imperfect enforceability of contracts means that the creditors will 
not be able to force the debtors to fully repay their debts as promised, but that the debtors 
fully repay only if it is in their own interest to do so. Since both parties are aware of this 
feature and act rationally, the lender will lend to a given borrower an amount (possibly zero) 
that will be in the debtor's interest to repay as promised.  
To invest k, the entrepreneur borrows  ( ) k a −  from a financial intermediary at the 
interest rate r, which is the risk-free interest rate at which people can borrow and lend in this 
economy.  At  the  beginning  of  the  current  period,  after  observing  the  ability  shocks,  the 
entrepreneur determines the demand for capital to maximize his profits, given his financial 
asset a. His profit function is : 
( , ) ( )
k
borrowing
Max a A k k r k a
ν π θ θ δ = − − − ￿ ￿ ￿ 
subject to 
'
( , ) (1 ) ( , ) (1 )( ) 0 1, 0
entrepreneur sincomeif default
a a r k a with k π θ κ π θ κ ≥ − + + − ≤ ≤ ≥ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ . 
The  constraint  captures  the  incentive  compatibility  constraint  implying  that  total 
entrepreneur’s profits need to be higher than entrepreneur's income if he defaults, i.e., we 
cannot  observe  any  default  in  equilibrium.  The  first  term  of  the  right  hand  side  of  that 
equation is the profit that the household keeps for herself and the second term is the amount of 
payments to the financial intermediary that it saves because of default. 
   10 
The scalar κ denotes the fraction kept by the bank in case of default, thereby capturing 
the tightness of borrowing constraints or the degree of the enforceability of the loan contract. 
As  κ increases,  the  entrepreneur’s  income  in  case  of  default  falls,  thereby  reducing  the 
incentive to default: the enforceability of the loan contract improves, the bank is willing to 
lend more to finance entrepreneurial activities which allows entrepreneurs to expand their 
business. 
The compatibility constraint can be rewritten as 
( , ) (1 )( ) a r k a κπ θ ≥ + −  
The compatibility constraint defines the maximum amount that can be borrowed by 
the entrepreneur. Entrepreneurs are endogenously divided into two groups, depending on their 
incentive to default. 
 
Group 1:  The  constraint  is  ( ) ) )( 1 ( , a k r a − + ≤ θ κπ .  The  incentive  constraint  is  not 
binding. The unconstrained household chooses the amount of invested capital  unconstr k  such 





















This demand for capital does not depend on initial wealth but only on technological 
parameters.  With  only  one  level  of  entrepreneurial  ability  and  in  absence  of  borrowing 
constraint,  there would be only  one optimal investment size.  Without limited  liability,  as 
entrepreneurs can borrow any amount from the bank, occupational choice would not depend 
on wealth. 
 
Group 2:  The constraint is  ( ) ) )( 1 ( , a k r a − + = θ κπ , the incentive constraint is binding. 
The capital demand is constrained. The no default condition implies 
( ) ) )( 1 ( , a k r a
constr − + = θ κπ  
which defines an upper bound to the investment project k implemented by the entrepreneur. 
The demand for capital depends on ex ante wealth a, indicating that the loan granted to the 
entrepreneur  depends  on  the  household  wealth  that  can  be  pledged  as  collateral.  In  our 
framework, wealth plays the role of collateral and limits default: the higher is the amount of 
household wealth  invested in  the business, the larger is  the  sum that the bank  is able to   11 
recover. 
10 With limited liability, the demand for capital becomes increasing in wealth for 
constrained  entrepreneurs  until  the  entrepreneur  has  enough  wealth  to  operate  at  the 
unconstrained level. 
 
4.3. Value Functions 
 
At the beginning of each period, current ability levels are known with certainty, while 
next  period's  levels  are  uncertain.  Each  individual  starts  the  period  with  assets  a, 
entrepreneurial abilityθ , working ability ε  and chooses whether to remain an entrepreneur or 
a worker or being inactive during the next period. The entrepreneur's problem is thus 
( ) { } ) ' , ' , ' ( ), ' , ' , ' ( ), ' , ' , ' ( ) ( ) , , (
' ,
θ ε θ ε θ ε β θ ε a V a V a V Max E c u Max a V r w e a c e + =  
0
) 1 ( ) , ( '
≥
− + + =
a
c a r a a θ π
 
The expectation term in value functions capture the idiosyncratic uncertainty regarding 
next period’s abilities. The worker's problem is written as 
( ) { } ) ' , ' , ' ( ), ' , ' , ' ( , ) ' , ' , ' ( ) ( ) , , (
' ,
θ ε θ ε θ ε β θ ε a V a V a V Max E c u Max a V r w e a c w Ψ − + =  
0
) 1 ( '
≥
− + + =
a
c a r l w a ε  
The term  l is labor input which is inelastically provided by the worker. The parameter  Ψ  
denotes start-up costs that are paid in terms of utility if the worker decides to start his own 
business 
11.  We  choose  to  capture  start-up  costs  in  utility  terms  as  these  costs  involve 
administrative  time-consuming  procedures.
12  They  could  also  be  introduced  in  monetary 
terms in the budget constraint or, if leisure is included in the utility function, in terms of 
opportunity  cost.  We  only  consider  the  psychic/utility  costs  without  specifying  the 
mechanism. 
Finally, the inactive worker’s value function is given by 
 
                                                
10  Paulson,  Townsend  and  Karaivanov  (2006)  consider  a  model  of  occupational  choice  when  financial 
constraints stem from two sources: limited liability and moral hazard. In our framework, we will consider only 
the limited liability environment. 
11  The  introduction  of  start-up costs  in  heterogeneous  agent  model  of  occupation choice  is mentioned  in  a 
footnote in Cagetti and De Nardi (2005) as a check for the robustness of their results. Luo (2005) argue that start 
– up costs are introduced in his model. However, they are calibrated to 0. In both papers, the interplay between 
start-up costs, wealth and entry into entrepreneurship is not studied. 
12 We have also introduced star-up costs in the budget constraints. The main results are not modified.   12 
( ) { } ) ' , ' , ' ( ), ' , ' , ' ( , ) ' , ' , ' ( ) ( ) , , (
' ,
θ ε θ ε θ ε β θ ε a V a V a V Max E c u Max a V r w e a c r Ψ − + =  
0
) 1 ( '
≥
− + + =
a
c a r p a  
 
with  p  the average pension level or non employment benefit. Inactive people may decide to 
go back to the labor market. 
Notice that the inactive’s value function  ) ' , ' , ' ( θ ε a Vr  is the same for the entrepreneur 
and the worker. We are aware that, in the countries of our sample, the pattern of inactivity 
benefits differ for workers and self-employed. However, in order to keep the model tractable, 
we  calibrate  the  inactivity  to  similar  values  for  the  worker  and  the  entrepreneur,  which 
reduces  the  number  of  value  functions  and  state  variables  in  the  model.  This  makes  the 
economic mechanisms of the model more transparent and we leave this extension for future 
research. 
 
4.4. Definition of Equilibrium 
 
Our heterogeneous agent model is based on a steady state economy without aggregate 
uncertainty. The stationary equilibrium consists of agents’ choices for consumption, savings 
and  occupational  choice  { } ) , , ( ), , , ( ), , , ( θ ε θ ε θ ε a a a a c Γ ,  value  functions 
{ } ) , , ( ), , , ( θ ε θ ε a V a V w w ,  a  stationary  distribution  of  households  ) , , ( θ ε λ a   and  a  set  of 
aggregate variables { } K L A , ,  such that 
i.  Entrepreneurs maximize their profits, thereby choosing an investment size ) , , ( θ ε a k . 
ii.  Saving decisions for workers  ) , , ( ' θ ε a g a w =  and entrepreneurs  ) , , ( ' θ ε a g a e =  as well 
as  occupational  choice ) , , ( θ ε γ a Γ =   are  solutions  to  workers  and  entrepreneurs’ 
maximization problems where 










, , , , 1
) , , (
θ ε θ ε
θ ε  
for all ability levels ( ) θ ε, . The household’s policy function  ) , , ( ' θ ε a a Ω ≡  eventually 
depends on occupational decision such that 
[ ] ) , , ( ) , , ( 1 ) , , ( ) , , ( ) , , ( θ ε θ ε θ ε θ ε θ ε a g a a g a a w e Γ − + Γ = Ω    13 
iii.  The endogenous invariant distribution ( ) θ ε λ , , a  consistent with optimal household’s 
decisions  ) , , ( θ ε a Ω  is such that 
( ) ( )
{ }
( ) θ ε θ ε π θ ε λ θ ε λ
θ ε
, ' , ' , , ' , ' , '
) , , ( ' : ∑ ∑
Ω =
=
a a a s
a a  
where  ( ) θ ε θ ε π , ' , ' denotes the Markov processes governing changes in ability levels.  
iv.  The real interest rate and wage are such that capital and labor markets clear. The 
equilibrium aggregate capital supply and demand are denoted A and K respectively. 
Supply of capital given by optimal saving choices equals the demand for capital from 
the entrepreneurial and corporate sectors: 




a g a K a k a ) , , ( ) , , ( ) , , ( ) , , (
, ,
θ ε θ ε λ θ ε θ ε λ
θ ε θ ε
 
Labor  demand  stems  from  the  corporate  sector  and  equals  the  labor  supplied  by 
workers. The equilibrium aggregate labor is denoted L. 
∑ ∑ =
a
c l a L ε θ ε λ
ε
) , , (  





We calibrate the economy on US data as a benchmark in order to stress the specific 
impact of key parameters of our model: start-up costs (Ψ ) and the tightness of borrowing 
constraints (κ ). In the benchmark calibration, start-up costs are set to 0 before increasing to 
0.5. κ  is calibrated to a middle value of 0.6. Other parameter values are based on Cagetti and 
De Nardi (2005)’s and Luo (2005)’s. Utility is log:  ) log( ) ( c c u = . Table 3 summarizes the 
calibration. 
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Table 3 Calibration of Parameters 
Parameter Definition Value
Depreciation rate 0.08
Share of capital in the corporate sector 0.36












Ability shocks follow exogenous and independent Markov processes estimated by Luo 
(2005) based on PSID data. Grid points for working abilities (normalized to an average of 
one) are 
[ ] ;1.51   0.93   0.57; = ε  
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Entrepreneurial talents evolve according to a Markov matrix that is independent of working 
abilities. 














47 . 0 265 . 0 265 . 0
2 . 0 7 . 0 1 . 0
0 1 . 0 0.9
' θ θ π . 
Considering 3 working  abilities and 3  levels of entrepreneurial talents,  we  have  9 
possible combinations of abilities( ) θ ε, . Finally, the steady state equilibrium interest rate in 
the economy without start-up costs equals 5%, which is consistent with long run data in 
OECD countries. Inactivity income is set at 40% of average income in the economy, which is 
consistent with Cagetti and De Nardi (2005). 
The model cannot be solved analytically. Numerical methods based on value function 
iterations are implemented using a grid for asset holdings a. For a given interest rate and 
wage: (1) We solve the entrepreneur’s profit maximization problem taking into account the 
occasionally binding borrowing constraint. We then get the demand for capital and the profit 
function, (2) We solve worker’s and entrepreneur’s maximization problem, yielding saving   15 
decisions and occupational choice, (3) We use decisions rules to compute the distribution of 
wealth and iterate until convergence of the distribution.  
 
4.6. Occupational Choice as a Function of Wealth 
 
Occupational decisions are made by comparing the expected utility of working in the 
corporate sector versus going into entrepreneurship. Expected indirect utilities are captured by 
value  functions  displayed  in  Figure  4.  We  first  present  the  occupational  choice  without 
inactivity option to illustrate how start-up costs affect the choice to become entrepreneur. The 
individual must choose between being worker or entrepreneur. 
 
Figure 4: Occupational Choice as a Function of Wealth 
(without retirement as an outside option, with start up costs) 
e V










0 > Ψ a
Ψ − e V
0 > Ψ a 0 > Ψ a
Liquidity constraints
+ Start-up costs Ψ − e V
 
Bold solid line: expected value function of an entrepreneur without start-up cost 
Solid line: expected value function of an entrepreneur with start-up cost 
Dash dot line: expected value function of a worker 
 
Let us first consider expected utilities for a worker  w V  and an entrepreneur  e V  in a 
liquidity  constrained environment without start – up  costs ( 0 = Ψ ). Both curves intersect 
once, thereby defining a threshold level of wealth 0 = Ψ a . Individuals with low asset holdings 
( 0 = Ψ < a a ) prefer to be workers since they cannot borrow enough capital to start their own   16 
business. When they are wealthy enough to provide collateral to the bank, entrepreneurial 
activities  become  an  attractive  choice,  all  the  more  so  as  any  increase  in  wealth  allows 
entrepreneurs to borrow more and expand their own business. 
With the introduction of start-up costs ( 0 > Ψ ), the expected utility of entrepreneurship 
shifts downward thereby increasing the threshold wealth level beyond which the individual 
decides to run his own business. Working in the corporate sector is preferred to starting one’s 
own business for a wider range of wealth. In a nutshell, higher start-up costs depress the 
marginal value of a dollar of additional wealth under liquidity constraints. This not only shifts 
down the fraction of entrepreneurs for all levels of wealth but also flattens the slope of the 
wealth profile. 
Figure  4  actually  captures  the  occupational  choice  of  individual  with  highest 
entrepreneurial activities. However, two types of agents never choose to be self - employed 
(i.e. at all levels of wealth,  e w V V > : the value function of working in the corporate sector is 
higher than the one derived from entrepreneurial activities).  
•  First, agents with low abilities as entrepreneurs are all workers. Due to their lack of 
talent  as  entrepreneurs,  they  would  rather  remain  workers  whatever  their  level  of 
wealth.  
•  In addition, individuals with high abilities as workers discard entrepreneurial activities 
since they can earn enough from the corporate sector and accumulate financial income 
from asset holding. They indeed enjoy the highest wages in the economy and are thus 
unwilling to give up the high outside opportunity to work in the corporate sector. 
The value functions suggest that some self selection is at work in the model: untalented 
entrepreneurs as well as individuals with high ability as workers discard the option of starting 
their own business. As a result, the introduction of start-up will not modify their occupational 
choice. 
Moreover, we get that low ability entrepreneurs and high ability workers are respectively 
located  at  the  left  and  right  hand  sides  of  wealth  distribution,  while  figure  1  illustrates 
occupational choice in the middle of wealth distribution. We develop this intuition assuming 
that low ability entrepreneurs are on the left hand side of wealth distribution while high ability 
workers are located at the other tail of wealth distribution. However, in our model, abilities 
are  not  perfectly  correlated  with  wealth.
13  With  endogenous  wealth  and  entry  into 
                                                
13  In  contrast,  Paulson,  Townsend  and  Karaivanov  (2006)  assume  that  talent  is  a  function  of  wealth  and 
education.  In  our framework,  abilities  follow  exogenous  Markov  processes that  are ex ante  independent  of 
wealth levels.   17 
entrepreneurship,  there  is  no  one-to-one  relationship  between  the  prevalence  of  self-
employment and wealth levels. The distribution of abilities across levels of wealth is actually 
given at the steady state by the endogenous equilibrium distribution.  
When the individual has to choose between entrepreneur, worker and retiree, this choice is 
based on a comparison between 3 value functions (figure 5). When old age pension is not 
generous,  the  expected  utility  associated  with  retirement  is  very  low.  The  occupational 
decision is then similar to the one presented in figure 1. In contrast, with generous pension 
schemes, the occupational choice is based on the intersection between 3 utility levels. The 
intersections  between  the  3  expected  utility  levels  define  2  wealth  thresholds.  When  the 
individual is poor, he chooses to work. If he is richer, he chooses to retire. The richest choose 
to become entrepreneurs.  
 
Figure 5: Occupational Choice as a Function of Wealth 




With start-up costs (figure 6), the entrepreneur’s expected utility shifts downward (as 
in figure 1), which increases the 2
nd wealth threshold beyond which entrepreneurial activities 
becomes a valuable option. With the increase in start-up costs, more individuals retire rather 
than start-up their own business.   18 
Figure 6: Occupational Choice as a Function of Wealth 
(with retirement as an outside option, with start-up costs) 
 
 
Figure  4  displays  the fraction  of  entrepreneurs for  each level  of  wealth  given  by  the 
endogenous  steady  state  wealth  distribution.  Notice  that,  while  figures  4-6  illustrate  the 
mechanisms behind occupational choices as a function of ex-ante wealth, figure 7 reports a 
measure of the prevalence of self – employment for each level of ex-post wealth. With limited 
liability, our model is consistent with Cagetti and De Nardi (2005)’s findings: the proportion 
of self employment increases with wealth. The model matches the current US fraction of self 
employed business owners (8.9% in the model versus 7.6% in the data, reported in Cagetti 
and De Nardi (2005)). In absence of financial market imperfections, with one entrepreneurial 
ability level, the curve would have been totally flat. Limited liability indeed makes the model 
consistent with the view that higher wealth helps relax borrowing constraints and allows an 
expansion of private businesses.   19 
Figure 7: Simulation of Fraction of Entrepreneurs as a Function of Ex Post Wealth 





























Liquidity constraint + Start up costs
 
The  introduction  of  start-up  costs  shifts  the  curve  downward  as  the  economy  is 
characterized by a lower aggregate proportion of self-employment
14. Notice that the curve 
flattens in the middle of the distribution while the slope of the curve is left unchanged at the 
tails of wealth distribution: in the middle of the distribution, the introduction of start-up costs 
widens  the  range  of  wealth  for  which  working  in  the  corporate  sector  is  preferable  to 
entrepreneurial business. In addition, since the threshold occurs at higher wealth and value 
functions  are  concave  in  wealth,  the  marginal  value  of  a  dollar  to  a  future  entrepreneur 
decreases with higher start-up costs. In contrast, low ability individuals as entrepreneurs at the 
bottom of the distribution and wealthy high ability workers always discard the option of going 
into the non corporate sector, whatever the start-up costs. 
 
5. The estimation approach  
 
The  average  level  of  entrepreneurship  results  from  theoretical  prediction  can  be 
testable  using  cross-sectional  data.  Our  empirical  strategy  is  to  look  for  a  different 
relationship between the fraction of entrepreneurs and wealth in countries that have different 
potential for liquidity constraints and start-up costs. The relationship is positive, more wealthy 
respondents are likely to be entrepreneurs. The prediction from the theoretical model is that 
                                                
14 Start up costs increase from 0 to 0.5. The proportion of self employment in the steady state economy is then 
divided by 2.   20 
the  fraction  of  entrepreneur  increases  with  wealth  with  liquidity  constraints  but  that  this 
relationship  is  attenuated  with  the  presence  of  start-up  costs  (high  start-up  costs).  Also, 
simulations  from  the  model  show  that  predictions  held  when  looking  at  the  stationary 
distribution of wealth in entrepreneurship and in paid work and they take into account the 
outside option of non working. Hence we perform our analysis on the stock of entrepreneurs 
and workers and non working population in a given year and look at differences in the wealth 
distributions among the three groups.  
An  important  assumption  we  make  is  that  all  other  parameters  of  the  model  are 
constant (rate of interest, preferences, transition matrices). At first sight, this might appear 
restrictive. Our empirical strategy will be to control for various demographic characteristics as 
well as proxies for outside options (age fixed effect for retirement incentives) to take account 
of these differences. 
   
5.1. Parametric strategy 
 
We use a parametric multinomial to control for observed individual characteristics 
(e.g. age,  sex, education, marital status, household size, health status). An individual can 
choice to work as worker, entrepreneur or to be inactive. We use quintile dummies for net 
wealth although we have experimented with a variety of other functional forms with the same 
results. When interacted with institutional indices, the theory tells us that 
1)  with more liquidity constraints the effect of wealth should be stronger 
2)  with more start-up costs, the effect should be lower 
Hence, the proper test is one where we look at the sign of the parameters on the interactions 
between the wealth quintile dummies and the regulatory indices.  
For each alternative m=0,1,2 (0 = non working, 1 = worker, 2 = entrepreneur), the 




, , , , , , , 2 2 ij m ij m k m ij k k m ij k j j m ij m k k d x q q r β γ δ α ε
= = = + + × + + ∑ ∑    
And we observe this choice if the value of the alternative m is larger or 
* *
, , '  if    ' ij ij m ij m d m d d m m = > ∀ ≠  
Where  
•  ij d  denotes whether respondent i in country j is entrepreneur, worker or non worker.   21 
•  ij x  denotes individual characteristics of respondent i in the country  j: age, age 
squared, education, health, family type and size, sex ,… 
•  , ij k q  takes value 1 if the individual’s net wealth in the country j is in the kth quintile 
(of the distribution across countries).  
•  j r  denotes the liquidity constraint index (LC) and they interact with the quintile of the 
individual’s net wealth (we will also add to the estimation  j s , which the start-up cost 
index (SC)  , 2 k ij k j k q s
= ∂ × ∑ ))  
•  While  j α  denotes country fixed effects capturing other differences across countries 
( j α  takes value 1 if the individual i is in the country j, 0 otherwise). 
•  To take into account the outside options (in financial terms) associated to be retiree, 
disable or unemployed, we include a quadratic in age as well as a dummy for the 
normal retirement age. Parameters  of the quadratic  in age are allowed  to  vary by 
country.  
•  The  unobserved differences of individual characteristics are captured  by ij ε , which 
follows  an  extreme  value  distribution.  This  hypotheses  allows  us  to  write  the 
probability of the alternatives m, as indicate as follows 
, , , , , , 2 2 ij m ij m k m ij k k m ij k j j m k k v x q q r β γ δ α
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Our aim is to measure the effect of the liquidity constraints (LC) and the start-up costs 
(SC). To do that, we add these institutional aspects as control variables with an interaction 
between them and wealth. We use quintiles of wealth in order to avoid any other particular 
non linear form (i.e. a polynomial form). The interaction can be interpreted as a weakening 
(or strengthening) of the relationship between the probability of being entrepreneur and the 
level of wealth as LC or SC change. We use inactivity as the comparison alternative. The 
parameters show the desire of choosing one or other option (worker/entrepreneur) respect to 
the comparison alternative (inactivity). Our hypothesis is that parameters  δ  are positive if 
wealth is interacted with LC and negative if interacted with SC. For example, to test if the 
relationship between the probability of being entrepreneur and the wealth is attenuated in 
countries with large start up costs, it must be verified that ,2 ,1 0,  k k k δ δ < < ∀ . This test can be   22 
done as a joint test with the interaction parameters. The same test applies for interactions with 
liquidity constraints. 
 
5.2. Empirical Results 
 
We first test our first hypothesis estimating the model when wealth is interacted only 
with the liquidity constraint index. (A complete presentation of results is shown in Appendix 
C).  The  results  do  not  show  a  strong  positive  relationship  between  the  wealth  and  the 
probability of being entrepreneur in countries with more liquidity constraints (table 4) as we 
had  theoretically  predicted.  Although  positive  in  the  5
th  quintile,  the  interactions  remain 
largely statistically insignificant. However, countries with more liquidity constraints are also 
characterized with high start-up costs. From the theoretical prediction of the model, we know 
that higher start-up costs push the value function of being an entrepreneur outward hence 
increasing the wealth threshold where one wishes to be entrepreneur. Since the value function 
is concave, this shift decreases the marginal incentive of one dollar of wealth. In other words, 
the relationship between the wealth and the probability of being entrepreneur is attenuated 
with higher start-up costs. Therefore, the omission of the start up cost can hide the positive 
relationship  that  exits  between  the  liquidity  constraints  and  the  relation  wealth-
entrepreneurship. 
 
Table 4 Multinomial Logit Analysis: Choice between Non Working, Working and 
Entrepreneur in Function of their Wealth and Liquidity constraints 
Interaction with liquidity constraint index workers entrepreneur test difference
Q2 wealth X LC -0.111 -0.276
-1.66 -2.32
Q3 wealth X LC -0.054 -0.122 Chi2(4) = 5.89
-0.82 -1.06 p-val = 0.2075
Q4 wealth X LC 0.007 -0.198
0.11 -1.75
Q5 wealth X LC 0.202 0.108
2.77 0.95
Fixed effects country/age yes yes




Notes: estimation logit multinomial. Parameters and Student Statistics are used with corrected standard deviations with
household cluster. We include country and fixed effects. Moreover we control of individual features such as education,
health, quintiles of net wealth and marital status. The Test differences compute the Chi2 value with the test of the null
hypotheses where coefficients are the same in both equations.    23 
 
In table 5, we include interactions with SC and LC jointly. The results confirm the 
theoretical predictions. The relationship between wealth and entrepreneurship appears to be 
steeper with higher liquidity constraints. Coefficients are positive and statistically significant. 
The interaction with the liquidity constraint index, the result becomes positive and significant 
at the 1% level in the 3
rd quintile, in the 4
th quintile and in the 5
th quintile. We have also 
experimented  with  limited  heterogeneity  in  the  effects  of  observed  characteristics  across 
countries  with  practically  the  same  results.  On  other  hand,  when  we  include  the  wealth 
gradient is attenuated by higher start-up costs, particularly in the 4
th and 5
th quintile of the 
wealth  distribution  where  it  is  statistically  significant  at  the  1%  level.  That  means  that 
inclusions of start-up cost are important to understand the relationship of being entrepreneur 
and  wealth.  Empirical  results,  in  the  same  line  that  theoretical  predictions  show  that  in 
countries with high start-up cost for the fraction of workers in entrepreneurship, flatten this 
relationship by depressing the marginal value of being an entrepreneur as a function of initial 
wealth.  The  interaction  with  SC  is  negative  in  the  middle  of  the  wealth  distribution  for 
workers  and  entrepreneurs.  However,  it  is  more  pronounced  for  entrepreneurs  than  for 
workers. And this difference is statistically significant. Moreover, the interaction with LC is 
positive and stronger in the last quintile, where it is more pronounced the fraction of being 
entrepreneur and wealth. And this difference is also statistically significant. 
 
Table 5 Multinomial Logit Analysis: Choice between Non Working, Working and Entrepreneur 
in Function of their Wealth, Administrative and Liquidity Constraints   24 
Interaction with liquidity constraint index workers entrepreneur test difference
Q2 wealth X LC 0.229 0.244
2.49 1.23
Q3 wealth X LC 0.271 0.595 Chi2(4) = 9.53
2.88 3.04 p-val = 0.0492
Q4 wealth X LC 0.353 0.559
3.67 2.86
Q5 wealth X LC 0.464 0.773
4.2 3.83
Interaction with startup costs index
Q2 wealth X SC -0.587 -0.619
-5.22 -3.03
Q3 wealth X SC -0.509 -0.935
-4.61 -4.71
Q4 wealth X SC -0.534 -0.984 Chi2(4) = 15.28
-4.81 -4.98 p-val = 0.0042
Q5 wealth X SC -0.410 -0.855
-3.13 -4.21
Fixed effects country/age yes yes






Other studies have pointed out individual patterns as Blanchflower (1998), Hochguertel 
(2004) and Zissimopoulos and Karoly (2006). We find the same patters at descriptive level. 
We have included the most important control variables that we think that can matters in our 
regressions (a table C.1. displays statistic descriptive in Appendix C). We have tried other 
control variables and robustness that other studies use without any large differences in the 
results.
15  
We have also take into account the outsider options (in financial terms) associated to be 
retiree, disable or unemployed, including dummy variables for each age between 50 and 80, 
where parameters vary by country. We have also taken into account a dummy for the normal 
retirement age.  
 
6. Summary  
 
In  this  paper,  we  have  developed  a  simple  occupational  choice  model  of 
entrepreneurship with liquidity constraints and start-up costs that yields testable predictions 
on  the  cross-section  distribution  of  entrepreneurs  in  the  wealth  distribution.  Our  main 
                                                
15 i.e. different education definitions, individual health insurance situation, more disaggregated health measures 
and  job characteristics. We have also tried our institutional measures, LC and SC, in interaction with wealth one 
by one.    25 
prediction  was  that  although  liquidity  constraints  yield  an  increasing  wealth  profile  of 
entrepreneurs, start-up costs depress this profile. Intuitively this is due to the fact that with 
start-up costs, the threshold of wealth necessary to transit to entrepreneurship increases to a 
flatter  portion  of  the  value  of  being  en  entrepreneur.  Hence,  the  marginal  value  of  an 
additional dollar of wealth for entrepreneurship decreases with start-up costs, yielding a flatter 
wealth profile. Parametric evidence using comparable micro-data from 9 countries support 
this  prediction.  In  countries  where  start-up  costs  are  higher,  the  wealth  profile  of 
entrepreneurs  is  flatter  while  it  is  steeper  in  countries  where  more  financial  barriers  are 
present. 
   26 
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Appendix A Definitions of Variables 




Self-employment is a self-reported variable, working are wage paid and non 
working are retirees, unemployed, disables and others.
rself_stat
Multilogit analysis we have use non working in the base outcome versus self-
employed and working. It is our benkmark
Independent variables
Demographic variables
Age  with more than 50 years old and less of 80 years old
Sex Gender as control variable is considered, (male dummy) 
Marital Status Marital Status as control variable is considered, (married dummy)
Education
We consider two education levels, following the ISCE-1997 for SHARE 
and For ELSA High skilled is nvq4/nvq5/degree or equiv Middle skilled   
higher ed below degree, nvq3/gce a level equiv and  nvq2/gce o level equiv 
and low skilled are nvq1/cse other grade equiv, foreign/other and no 
qualification. In the case of HRS we consider High skilled  are some college 
and college and above, middle skilled is high-school graduate and low 
skilled are lt high-school and ged. We study low and middle skilled together 
versus high educated.  
Household size Household size is also considered as control variable
Three levels of health self-reported to complete. Very good health, good 
Health and fair/poor health. The omitted variable is very good health.
Main variables
Quantiles of net wealth wealth analysis and comparison across data base reported as in table A.1 Interaction of quantiles of 
net wealth to institituional 
variables Omitted variable the first quantile.
Institutional variables





Interactions between country dummies and age dummies as well as normal retirement age dummy
are considered. 
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Table A2 Classification of Assets 
Risky Assets (stocks, bonds) ha_r Debt (mortage+other) ha_d
Safe Assets (cash, savings account) ha_s Net Worth ha_nw
Gross housing (equity + mortage) ha_h
other (transportation, other real assets) ha_o
business assets ha_b
Gross wealth ha_gw Gross wealth ha_gw
Notes: Adapted from Kapteyn and Panis (2003)
Liabilities Assets
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Appendix B Regulation Indices 
 
We build two kind of indexes based on principal-component factors: (i) index to start-
up  costs  and  (ii)  index  to  liquidity  constraints.  The  index  of  start-up  costs  is  based  on 
regulatory and administrative opacity, administrative burdens on start-ups (see Nicoletti et al. 
1999)  and start ups cost index pondering procedures and week to open a establishment (see 
Fonseca et al., 2001 )
16. The index of liquidity constraints is based on government subsidies, 
Angel investments and Venture Capital, finance help from start-ups (see Acs et al.(2004)) and 
creditor rights, different constraints, bankruptcy and reorganization laws (see La Porta et al. 
(1998))  
Table B.1 Construction of Indices 
Index Start-up costs 
Proc./weeks index
United States 0.75 2.11 3.1 -0.937
England 0.78 0.09 3.9 -0.49
Germany 2.53 2.69 6.4 0.014
Sweden 1.04 3.56 4.9 -0.821
The Netherlands 1.59 1.39 5.9 -0.152
Spain 2.79 1.23 9.9 0.829
Italy 4.49 0.63 13.9 2.044
France 3.93 2.6 9.4 0.908
Denmark 0.43 2.51 2.4 -1.204
Government Financial barriers
subsidies Index
United States 11 11 1 -1.389
England 6 7 4 -0.5
Germany 8 8 3 -0.798
Sweden 1 4 2 1.068
The Netherlands 9 9 2 -0.939
Spain 4 3 2 0.754
Italy 2 1 2 1.37
France 3 2 0 1.395








                                                
16 Start-up costs index = no. of weeks + no. of procedures/average procedures per *week)/2. Both Fonseca et al. 
(2001) and Nicoletti et al. (1999) use LOGOTECH data from the European Commission. 
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Appendix C Descriptive Statistics and Detail Results of Estimations 
 
 
Table C.1. Individual Characteristics 
Mean Standard Deviations
Non working male 42% 49%
married 71% 45%
household size 2.21 1.01
high educated 19% 39%
health good 39% 49%
health fair/poor 37% 48%
workers male 52% 50%
married 72% 45%
household size 2.38 1.12
high educated 40% 49%
health good 38% 49%
health fair/poor 14% 35%
entrepreneur male 65% 48%
married 75% 43%
household size 2.46 1.15
high educated 38% 49%
health good 41% 49%
health fair/poor 13% 34%
Total male 48% 50%
married 72% 45%
household size 2.29 1.07
high educated 28% 45%
health good 39% 49%
health fair/poor 27% 44%
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Table C.2. Results with Liquidity Constraints Interactions 
Interaction with liquidity constraint index worker entrepreneur
Country Fixed yes yes
age 0.382 0.081
3.04 0.43
age*country dummies yes yes
age square -0.004 -0.002
-4.34 -1.04
age square*country dummies yes yes






household size 0.040 0.010
2.25 0.36
high educated 0.510 0.420
12.98 7.22
health good -0.430 -0.384
-11.63 -7.12
health fair/poor -1.472 -1.380
-31.05 -17.72
Q2 wealth 0.491 0.629
6.56 5.04
Q3 wealth 0.549 0.828
7.51 6.9
Q4 wealth 0.467 1.062
6.34 8.86
Q5 wealth 0.276 1.454
3.31 11.78
Q2 wealth X LC -0.111 -0.276
-1.66 -2.32
Q3 wealth X LC -0.054 -0.122
-0.82 -1.06
Q4 wealth X LC 0.007 -0.198
0.11 -1.75
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Table C.3. Results with Liquidity Constraints and Start up Costs Interactions 
Interaction with LC and SC index worker entrepreneur
Country Fixed yes yes
age 0.382 0.081
3.04 0.43
age*country dummies yes yes
age square -0.004 -0.002
-4.34 -1.04
age square*country dummies yes yes






household size 0.041 0.011
2.3 0.38
high educated 0.510 0.417
12.95 7.15
health good -0.427 -0.375
-11.51 -6.96
health fair/poor -1.468 -1.376
-30.93 -17.64
Q2 wealth 0.449 0.783
6.03 5.92
Q3 wealth 0.552 0.961
7.75 7.51
Q4 wealth 0.476 1.208
6.66 9.47
Q5 wealth 0.285 1.595
3.51 12.17
Q2 wealth X LC 0.229 0.244
2.49 1.23
Q3 wealth X LC 0.271 0.595
2.88 3.04
Q4 wealth X LC 0.353 0.559
3.67 2.86
Q5 wealth X LC 0.464 0.773
4.2 3.83
Q2 wealth X SC -0.587 -0.619
-5.22 -3.03
Q3 wealth X SC -0.509 -0.935
-4.61 -4.71
Q4 wealth X SC -0.534 -0.984
-4.81 -4.98
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